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TO

THE MEN OF KENT.

On the fall of Cadiz, and on the state of England, compared with that of France.

Kensington, October 15, 1823.

GENTLEMEN,

ANOTHER of my "*lying prophecies*" now stands before the public. The base, corrupt and stupid press of London has been entertaining its besotted readers with what it calls my "*false prophecies*." Another of these false prophecies has, I say, now been placed before the public. From the very dawn of the French project for the invasion of Spain, I warned my readers, that the intention of France was to get possession of the fleets and arsenals

and ports of Spain, and, in short, to make that country in effect a part of the French dominions. The sots, who conduct the London press, put an idiot laugh upon my warning; called me a croaker; called me a "*false prophet*;" and called upon its brutified readers to give money into the hands of the profound statesmen composing the "*Spanish Committee*," in order that these statesmen might supply the heroes in Spain with the sinews of war.

At all the balderdash of the Hobhouses, the Whitbreads, the Bot Smiths, the Erskines (the *patriotic Erskines*); at all this balderdash; and at the no less glaring balderdash of the renowned *defenders* of the poor Queen: at their balderdash at Westminster, in the CITY, at GLASGOW, at NOTTINGHAM; at the eloquent

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tirades of the one and at the stupid and hollow noise of the other, who declared, at NOTTINGHAM a week or two ago, that the *fate of liberty* was about to be decided in Spain: at all this balderdash, all this rant, all this noise and nonsense, I have constantly laughed, and the greater part of my readers have laughed along with me. Not thus, however, has it been with the far greater part of this deluded, and justly punished public, who deserves to suffer, and to suffer severely, too, for the encouragement which it has given and still gives to this corrupt and infamous press.

CADIZ is now in the hands of the French. This is no Battle of Waterloo affair. In the first place, it is a conquest not obtained by a debt of eight hundred millions of money. The French have subdued Spain by *themselves*: Mr. BROUGHAM anticipated, that they would have to call in the *Cossacks* and *Calmuks* to their aid. His lying friends of the London press; those whom he declares to afford

us the best means of public instruction ever devised by human ingenuity; these "*highly respectable*" ruffians assured their benighted readers, that a Russian army was marching down towards the Rhine, and that another Russian army was about to be conveyed by sea to be landed in Catalonia, in order to *assist* the French in their subjugation of Spain; and these base and bawling newspapers affected to ridicule the idea of the conquest being achieved by France alone.

Day by day (for I *then* had the columns of a newspaper in my hand); day by day, as these lies made their appearance, I detected and exposed them. Of little avail, however, was this: the corrupt and stupid creatures were believed by a large portion of the people; and the delusion was kept up from week to week and from month to month in spite of the evidences of men's senses. Cadiz has, however, *fallen*; this is a fact which even this corrupt press cannot keep from the know-

ledge of the public. This is unquestionably the *most important maritime fortress in the world.*

This fortress is now in the hands of the French, and in their hands it will, in effect, remain *as long as the English National Debt shall last.* The newspapers which give us an account of the fall of Cadiz, tell us also that it is said at Paris, that the **FRENCH MEAN TO KEEP POSSESSION OF THAT FORTRESS, AS LONG AS WE KEEP POSSESSION OF GIBRALTAR!** Good. My readers will recollect that I said, before the French actually marched into Spain, that, unless the interest of the English Debt were almost annihilated, the **FRENCH WOULD HAVE US OUT OF GIBRALTAR IN THREE YEARS.** This appears likely to become another "*false prophecy.*"

Cadiz is worth fifty times as much as Gibraltar. It is superior to it for every purpose whatever; and in every respect it is beyond all measure more valuable. There are the French in

possession of it; and, upon what ground are WE to object to their keeping possession of it? *Temporary* possession of that and of all the fortresses in Spain we shall hardly have the impudence, I mean the modesty (for our impudence is modesty); we shall hardly have the modesty to object to their having temporary possession, seeing that when we had "*conquered France,*" we insisted upon keeping possession of certain parts of France for *five years,* and of taking certain fortresses away from her for ever as we thought. Our pretext for keeping up an army in France and for *making the French people pay for it;* our pretext for these was, that our army was necessary to prevent the "*hydra of revolution from rearing its hideous head.*" And shall not the French keep up an army in Spain, and take possession of Spanish fortresses, and make the Spanish people pay their army for the same purposes? Is there one law, one gospel, one moral

principle, one rule of right for *us*, and are there others for *them*? Have we sung God save great George our King, have we blustered, bragged and bullied; have we gained victories on the Serpentine river (though we gained none on the Lakes of Canada); has Mr. BROUGHAM bothered us about the greatest Captain of the age, until we, at last, believe in good earnest, that we are to bind down all other nations by the strict rules of moral rectitude, while we ourselves, in our quality of the "greatest Empire in the world," are to plead an exemption from all rules whatever? If we have brought ourselves to this belief, the French will presently undeceive us; for they will keep possession of Spain, and Monsieur de CHATEAUBRIAND will give Mr. CANNING some pretty rappings upon the knuckles, if he shall venture to utter a word in the way of *remonstrance*.

Will Mr. CANNING say, by what *right* do you hold these fortresses? If he do, the answer will be, by

the same right that you held the fortresses of France. Will he tell them, that they entered Spain not to make war against the King of Spain, but against his rebellious subjects? They will answer, and did you enter France as enemies of the King of France? No; you entered it as the *allies* of the King of France: you called yourselves his allies: you declared that you were making war *for* the people and King of France, and only *against* the usurper and his adherents; and yet, being in France, having, as the allies of the King and people of France, got into the country with nearly a million of men of different nations in your pay; having thus got into France, you dictated terms to the King of France; you quartered an army in his country and made his people pay for it; you took away fortresses of defence from his frontiers; and you stript his galleries and museums.

What reply would our jesting Minister have to make to an answer like this? No reply, to be

sure; for even unto brass itself it is not given to afford the face necessary to such reply. And, as to GIBRALTAR! As to this ticklish point, upon what ground are we to call upon the French to quit Cadiz as long as we hold Gibraltar? Are we to say to the French: You have no right to Cadiz, seeing that you did not take it in *open war against the King of Spain*, as we took Gibraltar? The French would answer, Why do you keep the Cape of Good Hope and the Island of Ceylon? You took them, *not when at open war against the Stadtholder*; but when you were professing to make war for the Stadtholder, and while the Stadtholder was actually *living in England*. Again, Why did you take and why do you keep MALTA? MALTA belonged to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. The French revolutionists took it from the Knights. You took it from the French; *but did you restore it to the Knights?* Oh! no! At the peace of Amiens you stipulated solemnly to restore it to

the Knights; but you went to war again, when you were called upon to fulfil the stipulation, and your Ministers openly declared in Parliament, that one of the objects of your new war was to enable you to avoid the surrendering of Malta!

Will our Minister answer and say: "Aye; but these things took place a long while ago: *treaties* have been made since we took possession of the CAPE OF GOOD HOPE and of MALTA; and these places have been *ceded and guaranteed* to us by these treaties." — "Oh!" the French Minister will say, "is that all you want? Morbleu! we will give you treaties enough! you shall have half a dozen of them by the next post: one for CADIZ, another for CORUNNA, and, if you wish it, for every sea-port and fortified town in Spain: treaties are cheap enough things. They do not cost above fifty livres apiece, though made in the name of the Holy and undivided Trinity. Six penny-worth of paper, pens, ink, and

“wax, and a day’s work for a
 “clerk, makes CADIZ as lawfully
 “ours as the CAPE OF GOOD
 “HOPE and MALTA and GIBRAL-
 “TAR are yours.”

Now, Gentlemen, what is our Minister to find to say, in answer to this. Some crazy poet exclaims, “Oh! for a muse of fire!” Our Secretary of State is a poet; and, as I told him long ago, he must write under the influence of a muse of *gunpowder*, or it is perfectly useless for him to attempt to dispute with the French. However, it must be confessed that there is no ground whatever for our keeping GIBRALTAR, which will not equally serve the French as a ground for keeping CADIZ: nay, they have a ground for keeping CADIZ, and fair ground, too, which we have not for keeping GIBRALTAR. If we say that we *have it*; they will surely say of CADIZ, we have it also. If we say, we have had GIBRALTAR for a hundred years and more, they will doubtless say, that there was a time, when we had not had it a

hundred days; and that, we did not, nevertheless, then give it up. They will, besides, remind us, that they had had Canada for a hundred years; and that they had had *Guernsey* and *Jersey* from the time that France became France; and that we, nevertheless, took CANADA and GUERNSEY and JERSEY from them, and hold those possessions to this hour. If we say that it will *hurt our feelings* to give up GIBRALTAR, they will doubtless remind us of MARSHAL NEY; and will not fail to observe, that they have feelings as well as we, and that those feelings were not much consulted by us in the affair of the galleries and museums, and in those votes of public money in England for building monuments to commemorate the *conquest of France*, though it was notorious to those who voted the money, that we entered France as the *allies of the King of France and the French people*, and that we had to help us above *seven hundred thousand* Russians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Ger-

mans, Prussians, Poles, Switzers, Dutchmen, Swedes, Bavarians, Savoyards, Dalmatians, Croatians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and God Almighty knows who besides, paid by us out of **BORROWED MONEY**, which borrowed money we have *now to repay*! They will doubtless remind us, or, rather, make us acquainted with the fact, that they have feelings as well as we; and that as we had no regard for those feelings in 1815, so they are not bound to have any regard for ours in 1823.

Our Minister will hardly pretend that Gibraltar is at all necessary to the *protection or defence of these Islands*. He will hardly pretend that. If he were mad enough to do it, the French would need only to pull out a map of Europe to show him how much *more necessary* Gibraltar must be to the protection and defence of France! Will our Minister say that the *protection of our commerce*, in time of war, requires us to possess GIBRALTAR? "Oh! thank you for that," will France say.

"And so, you want GIBRALTAR that you may carry on your commerce along my coast with impunity, while you are making war upon me! You are frank, I must say; but your effrontery is unparalleled."

If our Minister were to let slip out (and his *discretion* is quite equal to it), that it would be *insulting and degrading* to the Spanish King and the nation, for the French to hold this maritime fortress of CADIZ; if our witty Foreign Secretary were, in the plenitude of his discretion, to make use of such an argument, would not the Frenchman exclaim, insolent, that you are, evacuate GIBRALTAR or hold your tongue?

What, then, does it amount to, Gentlemen? There are two great maritime fortresses in Spain.—We have possession of the one and the French of the other. Their title to CADIZ is as good as ours to GIBRALTAR. The very same motives that induce us to keep possession of GIBRALTAR, point out to them to keep CADIZ.

GIBRALTAR is useful to us, because it enables us to *injure* both France and Spain. CADIZ will be useful to the French, because it will enable them to protect themselves, and, indeed, their more feeble neighbours the Spaniards, against the injuries inflicted by us, in consequence of our possession of GIBRALTAR. The holding of CADIZ by the French is, as long as we hold GIBRALTAR, a *measure of self-defence*. With GIBRALTAR and MALTA in our possession, and with CADIZ in the possession of the feeble Spaniards, there can be no safety for any commerce of France and Spain, during a war with us. But, if CADIZ be in possession of the French, GIBRALTAR will be rendered *comparatively harmless*; so that, as I said before, the French may stand fairly upon the ground of self-defence; and, if they consent to evacuate CADIZ and CORUNNA, upon condition that we restore GIBRALTAR to the King of Spain, and MALTA to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem,

what right shall we have to accuse them of injustice or of views of territorial aggrandizement? Some of our noisy and empty-headed politicians have been bawling a long time against French encroachment on the *independence of Spain*. Our Government did not, I suppose, encroach on the *independence* of Portugal some years ago, when one of our *Generals* was, in effect, the Sovereign of the country. But the very spirit of Protestant jesuitism itself (a great deal worse than Catholic jesuitism), would not be able to make it out; would be able to persuade nobody but the idiot readers of the Old Times newspaper, that the independence of Spain would be *more* encroached upon by the French possessing CADIZ, than it is by our possessing GIBRALTAR; and, if the French say; "You complain, Messieurs les Anglois, you complain that we attack the independence of Spain; your wise men of both parties have set up this cry; even your Prime Minister, who

" had a hand in making the Peace
 " of Amiens, and in breaking that
 " Peace ; and who, for two-and-
 " twenty years, cried aloud that
 " England had a right to interfere
 " in the affairs of France : even
 " this Prime Minister joined in the
 " cry against us, for having made
 " an attack on the independence
 " of Spain. Pretty modest this
 " in the Minister of a country
 " which still held in its own hands
 " one of the principal fortresses
 " of this same Spain, and which
 " had recently got into its posses-
 " sion a considerable portion of
 " the Colonies of France, Spain
 " and Holland ? middling modest
 " this ; but, to put an end to all
 " disputes about the *independence*
 " of Spain, let England give up
 " the fortress in Spain which she
 " possesses, and France will keep
 " not an inch of Spanish territory
 " in her hands."

Do you not perceive, Gentle-
 men, the effect which a proposi-
 tion like this would have in the
 opinions of the rest of Europe ;
 and do you not perceive the effect

that this must have in the minds
 of the Government and the people
 of the North American States ?
 These latter want to trade in the
 Mediterranean. They know well
 how many millions of dollars they
 lose, during a year of war be-
 tween France and England, by
 our *possessing* the Fortress of
 GIBRALTAR ? And they know, full
 as well as other people, how to set
 a proper value upon millions of
 dollars. The American States are
 obliged to have ships of war to
 protect their trade against the
 barbarians of Africa ; and, is it
 not notorious, that these barba-
 rians would be instantly rooted
 out ; or, at least, that their pira-
 tical functions would be totally
 destroyed, were it not for our *pos-
 session of Gibraltar*.

There would be something so
 plausible ; there would be such
 manifest fairness, in such a pro-
 position coming from the French,
 that we should have the opinions
 and the voice of all mankind
 against us, and the arms against
 us, too, of the nations most to be

dreaded, if the dispute ended in war. What, then, am I ready to give *my assent*; I, an Englishman, always setting a higher value upon the character than upon any thing else belonging to my country; am I ready to give *my assent* to the surrender of this Fortress of GIBRALTAR, this bright jewel with which the last Sovereign, before the Brunswickers came, adorned the Crown of England; this Fortress so famed in our wars; this scene of English valour; this bridle in the mouth of France; this key to an ocean: am I ready to give my assent to the surrender of this Fortress? If I were a Minister of England I should go mad at the thought of having the request made to me by France; and as to consenting to the thing, I would rather, if I had threescore years of life yet to come, see England swallowed up by the sea.

But, alas! Gentlemen, it is not what I wish or what you wish, or what any of us wish: that is not the question: the question is, What

will be done, what must be done, if the *interest of the Debt* be not reduced? This is the question, Gentlemen, and this is a question by which the Ministers would be driven to distraction if the *gentlemen opposite* were sincere.—

But, instead of placing this matter fairly and strongly before the people, what did they do? Set up a bawling against the French, uttered great parcels of stuff worthy of a pot-house; railed against the Holy Allies, against the King of France, against his Ministers and his Generals, against the “Three Gentlemen of Verona,” and the novels of Mons. de CHATEAUBRIAND; railed, in short, against every thing and every body, except the two blessed sets at Whitehall and at St. Stephens, and except the rascally jews and jobbers of Change Alley and their vile instruments the newspapers. Had Mr. BROUGHAM and Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, on the first day of the Session; had they *joined me*, and said to the Ministers, “Reduce the interest of the

"Debt, sell the Church and
 "Crown Lands, make an honest
 "adjustment between debtors and
 "creditors, *and go to war*, unless
 "the French desist from their
 "projects against Spain." Had
 they joined me and said this to
 the Ministers, instead of putting
 forth a parcel of big and unmean-
 ing talk about the liberties of the
human race; had they done this,
 with what justice would they now
 be able to come and accuse the
 Ministers of having put France in
 possession of all the strong holds
 of Spain? As it is, they have no
 right to complain of the Ministers,
 they may go to dinners about the
 country, and carry on the sweet
 intercourse of toasting and prais-
 ing each other; but the French,
 if they think it worth their while
 to pay attention to the actions of
 such men, will be only amused
 with their folly.

This fall of CADIZ; this con-
 clusion to the war in so short a
 period and at such a season of
 the year, is a body-blow to our
 THING; to the boroughmongers

and to the jews, too. It is a stab
 into the bowels of them both; and,
 therefore, matter of *unmixed joy*
with me. There are some men,
 and very good men, too, who have
 looked upon the cause of the
 Cortes as the *cause of liberty*.
 That surprisingly wise gentleman,
 the City of Wisdom's Common
 Sergeant, is reported to have said
 the other day at NOTTINGHAM,
 that liberty must *live in Spain or*
have no life, so that we may now
 set to work and cut our throats;
 for, according to him, the French
 have *killed liberty*. Different men
 mean different things when they
 talk about *liberty*. Does the reader
 recollect a sentence passed by this
 Common Sergeant upon one of
 Mr. Carlile's shopmen, about
 fifteen months ago? That is what
 he means by liberty, then. That
 shopman, Mr. Carlile himself,
 his sister, Mrs. Wright, are en-
 joying, according to this gentle-
 man, the blessings of liberty,
 which blessings, however, we do
 not see in their true light, until we
 view them in conjunction with

what took place before the Government's Police Justice, DYER, with regard to the Right Reverend Father in God, Bishop JOCELYN, uncle of the Earl of RODEN, and John MOVELY, a soldier of the Foot Guards. Thus, then, when we look at the sentence on Mr. Carlile's shopman, and at the speech made on the passing of that sentence, we may guess a little at what the Common Sergeant means by liberty. So far so good. And, now, as to the *Inquisition*, the restoration of which is looked upon as certain, and the horrors of which are dwelt upon by our Protestant liberty-lovers with a sort of melancholy hankering and delight. Curse the *Inquisition*, say I. I would, if I could, stick upon it all the curses contained in the 139th Psalm; but as liberty is to live in Spain or have no life; as Mr. DENMAN is so positive upon this point, will he be so good as to show, that the *Inquisition* has, during the last thirty years, inflicted any punishments so severe as those inflicted

upon Mr. Carlile, his wife, his sister, Mrs. Wright, the shopmen, and Joseph Swann? My real opinion is, that the *Inquisition* in Spain has, during the whole of the last thirty years, inflicted no punishments so severe as these. Can Mr. DENMAN prove the contrary? If he can, let him; and if he cannot, let him hold his tongue about Spanish liberty.

There are, however, some good men, who look upon it that despotism has now triumphed. To a certain degree, and in a certain way, and in a particular quarter, it has triumphed. But, those are very much deceived, who imagine, that this triumph will be favourable to our *boroughmongers*; and that is the thing which we have to look after; that is our affair. We are not, like Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, to look after the *human race*. We are to look after ourselves: we are to see how these events will affect our *enemies*; that is to say, the *boroughmongers*, who are so delighted with *Power-of-Imprisonment Bills*, and with *Six-Acts*.

Well, then, the reader may be assured that these boroughmongers and all their tools will be exceedingly annoyed by the subjugation of Spain, and by the occupation of her maritime fortresses by the French; for, stupid as the jolterheaded tyrants are, they cannot but see, that these events must lead to great consequences. Until the French resolved to march into Spain; or, rather, until their resolution to do it was made public; until this was not to be denied, our Ministers and their adherents affected not to believe that they would march. After the King of France had made his Speech to the Chambers, our Ministers, who are men of a very lively hope, predicted that the French would *not succeed*. That singularly wise personage, the stern-path-of-duty man, who was made a Knight of the Garter along with CASTLE-REAGH, very confidently predicted that the French *would fail*; that, after a long protracted warfare, they would be *compelled to retreat* into France; and that bright

youth, Mr. HOLME SUMNER, observed, that Charles V. had truly said, that if you invaded Spain with a *small army*, you were *defeated*; if with a *large army*, you were *starved*. Profound statesman! How he has profited from reading history.

These instances alone would be sufficient to prove that the Ministers, that their hangers on, and that the jolterheaded hare and pheasant tyrants all over the country, wished the French to experience a great deal of trouble and of loss. They wished the Spanish Constitution to be destroyed, and all schemes of liberty in that country to be marred and blasted. But, they did not wish that the *French should profit from their enterprise*. They hoped that it would be a long and tiresome and sanguinary affair, during which France would exhaust herself a good deal, and would throw great disgrace upon herself as well as upon the Spaniards; and that, at last, the affair would end with the destruction of liberty in Spain,

but at the same time, without leaving the French any thing to boast of. And, they hoped, at the same time, that they might be called in as *mediators*; and that thus they should keep disguised from the world, their utter inability to go to war. These hopes are now blasted. GATTON and OLD SARUM have now got a stab; and if nobody else can see how this is, I can.

We have now before us one of the great effects of the Pitt System of Government; that is to say, a system of anticipations; a system of *borrowing*, a system of *binding men to the Government* by the means of debts due to them from the Government. This system was begun by the Dutch King at the revolution. This system, as Mr. PAINE so well described it, "is *strength* in the "beginning, and *weakness* at the "end." A system of paper-money, if pushed to the extent that ours has been, or to any thing like that extent, must produce one of two things, a revolution in the

Government, or a complete and total degradation of the nation, which must become the sport of all its neighbours; because, after it is got to the end of its powers of borrowing, it *never can again go to war*, without something very nearly amounting to a revolution in the Government.

I have long foreseen, and as long foretold, that such would be the ultimate effect of our Debt. The effect is become visible to all eyes long before I thought it would. When the Meeting took place in Kent, only just about fifteen months ago, which of us could have thought, that, in only fifteen months from that day, the French nation, whom we so recently boasted of having conquered, would be in possession of CADIZ, with a resolution to keep it (as is said to be the case), as long as we keep possession of GIBRALTAR? One of my arguments in support of the proposition, which I had the honour to submit to the Meeting at MAIDSTONE, was this, that without a

reduction of the interest of the Debt, this country never could go to war again. The words which I addressed to you upon that occasion; that is to say, in defence of our Petition, which had been so rudely attacked in the House of Commons by JOHN SMITH, Mr. CALCRAFT, and KNATCHBULL, the brother of Captain CHARLES KNATCHBULL, English Consul at NANTES, of whose works in prison in London we read of the other day; these words, or at least, a small part of them, I cannot refrain from repeating here. You will observe, that the passage I am about to quote, was written in the month of June of last year; that is to say, full two months, if not three months before the assembling of the Congress at Verona; and, of course, long before I could have the smallest idea that the French intended to invade Spain. When we consider these things, the passage that I am about to cite, must appear, to some persons, really wonderful. There is, however, nothing won-

derful in the matter. There required but a very ordinary stock of understanding to foresee, that, situated as we were, the French nation would not long remain without making some attempt to inflict vengeance on us for the transactions of 1815. There required very little sagacity to discover, that something like that which has now taken place would inevitably take place in a short time. I had long been deeply impressed with the opinion, and the honour which I had in meeting you at MAIDSTONE, afforded me an opportunity of amply expressing it. It is useful to the public, as well as just to oneself, to recur to opinions, which events have so fully verified; and I quote the following passage with singular pleasure; because it will recal to the minds of all my readers your sensible and manly conduct upon the memorable occasion referred to.

“ This leads us to another and larger and more terrific view of the consequences of this all-cor-

" rupting, all-corroding, all-crip-
 " pling, and all-ruining Debt.
 " Well have the Petitions of the
 " Hundred of Tapping in Norfolk
 " called it a millstone, dragging
 " down the British nation; for, it
 " is dragging us down, and down
 " we are going at a greater rate
 " than nation ever yet fell! Are
 " we secure from the hostility of
 " our neighbours? Yet it may now
 " be said of England, that she
 " dares not think of war; that she
 " dare not even to be providing
 " against it, while her enemies
 " are growing to gigantic strength.
 " Will any one say that additional
 " taxes can be laid on to the
 " amount of even one million a-
 " year; much less to the amount
 " of thirty or forty millions a-year,
 " which a war would require. A
 " war with America and France
 " would see these islands invaded
 " in two months, without forty
 " millions a-year expenditure, in
 " addition to the present. And
 " is there any man mad enough
 " to suppose that those forty mil-
 " lions could be raised in taxes in
 " addition to the present taxes,
 " and with present prices? Would
 " the Government borrow again?
 " Would it make another string of
 " loans? Would it get those loans
 " in gold? Would it come back
 " again to the paper and to

" high prices? Would they make
 " another Debt of eight hundred
 " millions? And would they, at
 " the conclusion of such war,
 " again return to cash-payments,
 " pass another Peel's Bill, and
 " raise a hundred and thirty mil-
 " lions a-year in gold, with wheat
 " at four or five shillings a bushel?
 " Barely to ask these questions
 " seriously would savour of a
 " cracked brain; and, yet, there
 " are men to talk, like Mr. JOHN
 " SMITH, of paying the interest of
 " this Debt in gold to the full
 " amount, and not to admit the
 " possibility of ceasing to pay;
 " nay, and to deem it disgraceful
 " in you, that you do not concur in
 " the frantic doctrine. One of the
 " best means of obviating war, is
 " to take care to be in a state that
 " makes you not fear it. To see
 " you ready for war is always the
 " surest means of producing tem-
 " per, prudence and patience in
 " the adversary. Thus prepared;
 " standing in an attitude like this,
 " you come to every negotiation
 " of every sort, with advantages
 " far superior to all those with
 " which you can be furnished by
 " craft and by eloquence. Your
 " adversary looks at his man; and
 " having measured him from head
 " to foot, he acts accordingly. No
 " nation fears England at the

" present moment ; and in every
 " contest that we have had ; in
 " every dispute about navigation
 " and commerce, this Debt has
 " been a millstone about our
 " necks ; a millstone visible to
 " all the world ; a tremendous
 " weight in the scale in favour of
 " every one that has had a dispute
 " with us of any description. This
 " has been the cause of the pre-
 " sent projects for abrogating, in
 " part, at least, those navigation
 " laws ; that system of maritime
 " management and jurisdiction
 " which first gave us the prepon-
 " derance against France. The
 " bills at this moment in the
 " House of Lords, and which are
 " about to pass into laws, are the
 " result of vain attempts to obtain
 " profitable commerce by nego-
 " tiation. We want the money
 " derivable from commerce ; but
 " that very want deprives us of
 " the power of getting the com-
 " merce. Often has it been asked
 " why we have no commercial
 " treaty with France ; why the
 " Dutch overreach us ; why the
 " Americans take possession of
 " the Gulf of Mexico ; and actually
 " take a step upon the West In-
 " dia Islands, while our Govern-
 " ment seems stricken dumb ? The
 " answer is found in **THE DEBT**.
 " It is written in a figure of eight

" and eight ciphers and posted
 " up in 'Change Alley, and there
 " it tells the King of England :
 " **DARE NEVER TO TALK**
 " **OF WAR AGAIN AS LONG**
 " **AS I AM IN EXISTENCE!**

" It is unpleasant, it is painful
 " in the extreme, to have to per-
 " form the duty of foreboding the
 " downfall of one's own country ;
 " and if painful to the rest of man-
 " kind, what must it be to an
 " Englishman, who always feels
 " for his country, even when he
 " does not feel for himself ? Yet,
 " this is a duty to be performed,
 " and is imperious in proportion
 " to the mind's conviction of the
 " fact. My wishes can avail no-
 " thing ; but my sincere opinion
 " is, that if your prayer be not
 " heard ; if the interest of this
 " Debt be not reduced, *this nation*
 " *is doomed to become one of the*
 " *most contemptible upon the face*
 " *of the earth.* The American
 " statesmen, I know, regard our
 " Debt as their best security.
 " They rejoice at its existence
 " and at the obstinacy of our Go-
 " vernment in adhering to the
 " system they have so long pur-
 " sued. In France, I question
 " not, the same sentiments pre-
 " vail. Both those nations disen-
 " tangled themselves from their
 " Debts. They both took care to

“ get rid of the crippling load ;
 “ and while we are adhering to
 “ the enfeebling curse, they are
 “ growing strong by the migration
 “ to their shores of the capital,
 “ the industry and the genius of
 “ Englishmen.”

One would almost think, that I
 ha received intimation before
 hand, from some supernatural
 agent, of all that was going to
 happen during the next sixteen
 months. Our friend Lord DARN-
 LEY, would not hear of any reduc-
 tion of the interest of the Debt.
 He was *too honest* a man, he said.
 Wise COKE of Norfolk, and no less
 wise SUFFIELD, whose name is
 EDWARD HARBOARD, and whose
 father-in-law left him five hundred
 pounds to purchase a seat in Par-
 liament. These men abused me
 as if I had been a thief, and the
 latter compared me to *Oliver* or
Edwards, and was followed in his
 example by blackguard Parson
Smythies of Hereford ; because I
 had proposed a reduction of the
 interest of the Debt. Yet, without
 such reduction, GIBRALTAR *must*
go! That is my real opinion ; and
 the French Government is quite
 convinced that our Government
 dares not attempt such reduction.
 This is my own opinion, too ; for,
 Daddy COKE and SUFFIELD,
 and the rest of that crew, would

now seem to be begging for eter-
 nal execration, if they were to
 demand that which they have
 called me a villain and a spy for
 recommending. Thus the thing
 is most gloriously beset ; it has
 the Jews on one side of it, and it
 has the French on the other.
 Here stand we Radicals looking
 on : we see them tearing and pul-
 ling at the thing, and we heartily
 wish them success.

Our aristocracy and their un-
 derstrappers, our parsons, and the
 whole tribe of tax-eaters ; these
 are continually talking to us about
 the *horrors* of the French revolu-
 tion. They never say a word to
 us about the causes of it. The
 French were, under the old Go-
 vernment, most cruelly oppressed
 by the aristocracy ; and to this
 oppression we ought to ascribe the
 far greater part of the horrors of
 the revolution ; but, great as these
 oppressions were, France might
 have remained for centuries with-
 out a revolution, if it had not been
 for the effects of the funding sys-
 tem ; a system quite infernal in
 itself ; but at last, like most other
 evils, producing its own cure. I
 read several years ago, a passage,
 in *Young's Travels in France*,
 which attracted my attention at
 the first reading, and which I have
 often thought of since. It appears

to have been written in the year 1791, just after the French revolution had taken place. I insert it here, as worthy of the best attention of every one of my readers; and an additional motive is, to do an act of justice to the memory of Mr. YOUNG.

"It appears, from the preceding accounts (of the taxation), that France, under the old government, pursued the ruinous system of mortgaging its revenues, as regularly as any other country, whose greater freedom might be supposed to offer more temptations to the practice. This system, however, almost unaided by any other cause, has overturned that government, by means of the most extraordinary revolution upon record. If Louis XIV. amidst the splendour of his reign and career of his conquests, could possibly have foreseen that the second sovereign in descent from him would be led captive by his subjects, on account of the debts he was then contracting, he would either have rejected with horror the system he adopted, or have manifested the most entire want of those feelings which ought to dwell in the breast of a great and ambitious monarch. But, after this memorable example

"to other countries, it remains a subject of infinite curiosity, to see how far the *infatuated and blind spirit of funding* will now be pursued. Every hour, after the great event in France, will make it *more and more critical*, and will inevitably involve in its train new revolutions, perhaps of a complexion *more dangerous to established families, than any thing we have seen in France*— If peace is preserved in that kingdom, the debt will extinguish itself, being in a great proportion annuities for lives; but were not this the case, and should new wars add to the national burthens, the people, almost emancipated as they have been from taxation, will be brought back to it with great difficulty; and other assemblies, feeling their power better established, will not pay the same attention to the public creditors which the present has done; and the event might be similar to what will happen in England. No government will ever think of committing a deliberate act of bankruptcy; but when taxes are pushed to such a height that the people will no longer pay them, they are ripe for sedition; presently feel their own power;—and the event may

" *be easily conjectured.* What is
 " the conclusion that follows?
 " That the funding system, or ra-
 " ther the wars which occasion
 " it, are so fatal and pestilential,
 " that, at all events, they ought
 " to be avoided; but that, if, un-
 " happily, they cannot, they should
 " be supported by *annual taxes*
 " (never by loans), which imply
 " a war of defence *at home*; a
 " renunciation of all exterior do-
 " minion; and the absolute anni-
 " hilation of that *commercial sys-*
 " *tem of policy*, on which *con-*
 " *quests, colonies, and debts* have
 " been so *fatally erected.*"

Never were wiser remarks put
 upon paper, or uttered from hu-
 man lips. Louis the Fourteenth
 boasted of his *conquests*; the
 French called him their "*Grand*
Monarch;" he had many "*great-*
est captains" under him; he built
triumphal arches and columns to
 commemorate his *victories*: but, he
borrowed the money to pay for all
this; just as our people borrowed
 the money; just as our "good
 old king" and his son and the
 parliament, borrowed the money
 to pay for the "*glories*" that were
 won by our fleets and armies, and
 especially for the glories won on
 the Canadian Lakes and on the
 Serpentine River. Louis the
 Fourteenth, like our late grand

monarch, left a *debt* behind him!
 A *debt* he left for his successors
 to pay; and, as Mr. Young ob-
 serves, the SECOND of those
 successors was "led captive by
 " his subjects *on account of the*
 " *debts* that Louis the Fourteenth
 " contracted."

Divers were the *shufflings*, in
 France, in order to get out of
 this affair of the DEBT; divers
 schemes; project upon project;
 but, after all, the *church property*,
 as it was called, was the thing
 resorted to; and, even that was
 not sufficient. An *army*! A thun-
 dering standing army in time of
 peace? We have it; but, had not
 Louis the Sixteenth a thundering
 standing army in time of peace?
 Was there any want of *force* in
 France? In short, all was abject
 subjection; and yet, a *debt*, a
national debt, did the business of
 the strong and long-established des-
 potism. "Paper-money is *strength*
 " in the beginning and *weakness*
 " in the end." The French old
 Government was, at last, *despised*
 by the people even more than it
 was hated; and, when it came to
 be despised, it soon fell.

We, in this country, began the
 ruinous trade of borrowing soon
 after it was begun in France.
 But, we proceeded in it *more*
slowly. The French Government

got to the utmost stretch of its tether *thirty-six years ago*: our Government has just *now* got to the utmost stretch of its tether; and, the result will be much about the same, *unless ours resort to a reduction of the interest of the Debt*.

Mr. ROBINSON, at a Dinner at Birmingham, and Mr. CANNING at a late City Dinner, have talked of our *great prosperity*, and of the happy effects of *peace*. The French Government knows well how we stand. We cannot *deceive it*, though we may deceive one another. It knows well the effects of *national debts*; and it must rejoice to hear Daddy Coke and Daddy Suffield *becal* me for proposing a reduction of the interest of ours. To suppose, that the French will not endeavour to *recover* what they lost by the *alliance* of England, is to suppose them to be lost to all sense of interest as well as of honour. And, indeed, besides the point of *Gibraltar*, who can believe, that the French nation, regenerated, re-invigorated, and full of warlike means, will much longer submit to the insult offered it in our possession of the islands of *Guernsey* and *Jersey*? These islands almost touch the French land. The only se of them is to make France look

little in the eyes of Englishmen and of the world. A very *good use*; an use that I would still have them put to: but, is it to be believed, that, if we cannot keep the French from occupying CADIZ and CORUNNA, we sha'll be able to keep them from taking back Guernsey and Jersey? By *war* we might, in spite of *steam-boats*; but, *without war*, does any man in his senses believe, that this can be done for another five or six years? And, if the interest of the Debt *be not reduced*, we cannot go to *war*, and, such reduction is neither more nor less than *Radical Reform*, and what its enemies call REVOLUTION.

The French, once in quiet possession of Spain, will, beyond all doubt, endeavour to bring back to subjection the *South American Colonies*. And, if she do this, will she not *take part of them to herself*? Can we *prevent this*? By *war* we *might*; but, is it not madness to suppose, that we could do it *without war*? Or, is there yet a man left to believe, that we can stop the march of the French by noisy speeches and paragraphs? The very same reasons which rendered our prayers of no avail in the case of Spain, would render them of no avail in the case of her colonies; and, with what

face are we, who have *grabbed* Malta, the Cape, Trinida, Demerara, Ceylon, the Mauritius, Pondicherry, and *other little matters*; with what face are we, who grabbed all these, during our wars against "*Jacobins, Usurpers,*" and "for the *liberties, and independence* of Europe;" with what face are we to object to the French getting *a slice of South America* as a reward for their putting down "*Jacobinism*" in Spain?

Aye; but we have just sent out an *envoy* and *consuls* to the *Republic of Mexico*! Have we? We shall do well, then, I believe, to *recall* them as soon as possible, unless we mean to *fight for it*. What! Refuse to acknowledge the new Republics for five years; and, then, as soon as we see that France is about to make *Spain strong*, acknowledge those same Republics! This is a pretty thing indeed. It will be found, I fancy, that it is *too late* to set about this *acknowledging* work. The time to do it was in 1817, *when I recommended it to be done*, in my Petition to the Prince Regent, sent from *Long Island*. Then was the time; but then our pretty gentlemen were getting bills passed to *punish British subjects, if they assisted the South Americans!* With what face, then, are we to

acknowledge these new States *now*? The French will see, that we never thought of doing it, till we saw, that they would get possession of Cadiz; and they will know what conclusion to draw from that fact.

But, Gentlemen, what is the use of our sending *envoys* and *consuls*, unless we have *fleets* and *armies* ready to send! The French will pay no more attention to our agents sent to the "*Mexican Congress*" than they paid to those which we sent and had residing at the court of the *King of the Cortes* of Spain. Who is the envoy to Mexico I have forgotten; but I am full of expectation, that, be he who he may, he will be laughed at by some French general, as our delightful envoy in Spain has been. Kind Sir *William A'Court* (oh! the fine old *Norman* name) has been always ready with his *mediation*. What a farce! What a contemptible thing! Oh, no: the French wanted no *mediators* of any nation, and especially of the *English* nation.

And, now, then, we come to this: Are we ready *for war*, rather than suffer the French to possess *MEXICO* or *PERU*? Are we ready *for war*? That is the question. No: they must have *Mexico* and *Peru* too, or give one of them to

Russia, or a great island to Prussia: they must do just what they like; for go to war we cannot *without blowing up the Debt*, which we cannot blow up without blowing up the *church establishment* and the *boroughs*! Oh, no: we shall not stir. Our Government will be as fertile in *pretexts for peace* as it formerly was in *pretexts for war*. The nations all *know our state well*. They see, that what we have *got and grabbed*, we have *bought* with the money that we have borrowed; and they see, that we must now pay back this money, *three for one*, or blow up our whole **THING**; for, as I have often said, I do not know what *name* to call it by. The French know our state well: they describe it in their public papers: *they say we cannot stir*: and, can any one believe, that they, who are freed from Debt, who are rich and *really* prosperous, will not take advantage of this our state of weakness! After having, by means of borrowed money, got together bayonet men of all nations to "*conquer France*," we, now that we have the money *to pay*, are as helpless as babies. The *weakness* of paper-money is on us. And, will the French let slip this opportunity of regaining that which we, by means of troops hired by

our loans, wrested from them? The short and long of the matter is this: *we have been purchasing CONQUESTS and GLORIES with paper-money; and, being unable to pay for them, we shall, in due course of proceeding, BE OBLIGED TO GIVE THEM UP*; and, as is usually the case under circumstances of a similar nature, we shall, in the end, be compelled to give up a *great deal more* than we purchased with our paper-money.

By *resolute measures* we might save ourselves; but, as these include a great *reduction of the interest of the National Debt*, and as Daddies Coke, Suffield, and Wodehouse and Gaffer Gooch will not hear a word of such reduction, on any account whatever; as Lord Darnley will not hear of it; as Mr. Calcraft will make us "*ride off*," if we mention it; as Knatchbull, brother of Charles, Esquire, our gracious sovereign's *Consul at Nantes*, calls it *roguery* to propose such reduction; as this is the case, *we can have no reduction*; and must, of course, surrender our "*glories*," though, in rewards to one single man, they have cost us *seven hundred thousand pounds* already! Alas! But, let us take comfort; for, we shall, in spite of the Duc d'Angouleme,

have "*Waterloo Bridge*" and "*Wellington Boots!*"

Thus, Gentlemen, have I endeavoured to describe *some* of the consequences of that Debt, for a reduction of which we prayed, in the month of June of last year. If that prayer had been *graciously received by the Parliament*, instead of being abused and made a pretext for calumnies on me, *the French never would have marched into Spain*; or, if they had, Cadiz would not have fallen into their hands. But, when the French Government saw *that the Parliament dared not free the nation from the load that was weighing it to the earth*, they knew that *we could not go to war*; and, if they had doubted before, they could have no doubt upon the subject, when they heard the poor, puling language of our Envoy at Verona and of our Secretary of State. Even at a later period, the proceedings in *Norfolk*, in *Herefordshire* and in *Surrey*, and the conduct of Coke, Parson Smythies, Ellenborough, Suffield, and others, and *the language of our infamous newspapers*, must have had their effect; must have *confirmed* the French Government in their opinion of our inability to go to war. For whole

weeks the newspapers of London contained the most outrageous abuse of a proposition to lessen the interest of the Debt. The French Government *wanted no more than this*. "Keep you your *Debt*," said they, "and we will get and keep *Cadiz and Corunna*." By this time there cannot be a single politician in France unacquainted with our state. Every man of them must *now* see, that our Government *no more dares to talk of war* than it dares to make a *Radical Reform*. Such facts can never be *secret* long. There can be no war; no, though the French were to attack the *Isle of Wight*; there can be no war without a *blowing up of the Debt*; and the Debt cannot be touched without first *touching the church* and *putting down the boroughs*. There cannot be *another* "Bank Restriction Bill," and another game like the last. A nation plays such a game *but once*.

Curious affair, Gentlemen! The **THING'S** people *borrowed hundreds of millions of pounds* in order to hire and pay bayonet men to prevent the example of the subjects of the Bourbons from working injury to the **THING**: and, *now*, those Bourbons are insulting and kicking the **THING**, merely because the **THING** owes

those hundreds of millions of pounds.

With this I, for the present, leave the occupation of Cadiz and Corunna, and, indeed of Spain, by the French, to be contemplated on by Lord Darnley, his son, Knatchbull, Calcraft, John Smith, Daddy Coke, Suffield, Parson Smythies, wise Wodehouse, and Gaffer Gooch. But, mind, Gentlemen, *they will have no reduction of interest of Debt*: mind that: that they are to *stand to*.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your Friend and

Most obedient Servant,

WM. COBBETT.

ANNA BRODIE'S FALL.

ANNA, "notwithstanding her *coverture*," is getting blows pretty nearly, in her way, equal to those which the **THING** is now receiving from its friends, the Bourbons. When it was announced, that the **MORNING CHRONICLE** had passed into the hands of its present proprietor, I at once predicted, that

the **OLD TIMES** could not *stand long*; for, that it would now speedily lose all the advantage which it had derived from that priority of intelligence which it owed solely to the length of its purse. This opinion of mine has not had to wait long for proof of its truth. The *fate of Cadiz* was a subject of great interest with the public, and with no one more than with me. I was, therefore, for several days, eager (contrary to my usual state) *to see the morning papers*, in order to know, at as early a moment as possible, what was going on at Cadiz. This led me to make a very exact estimate of the relative value in this respect, of the two papers in question. The **CHRONICLE** of *second* October contained the *important correspondence between the Duc d'Angouleme and the King of Spain*; and this same correspondence, copied from the **Chronicle**, word for word, was in the **OLD TIMES** of the *next day*.—The **CHRONICLE** of the *fourth* of October gave us the *plan of Cadiz* and its environs, a most useful

thing at such a time. This plan decided the opinions of all who saw it, as to the fate of the fortress. It is not necessary to say, that the OLD TIMES contained no such thing. Its proprietors and editors and people have not the judgment necessary to the selection of such things. But, on this same fourth of October, the CHRONICLE gave us the *Note from the Spanish Ministry*, a document of great importance, which the OLD TIMES (from shame, I suppose) never published at all.—On the sixth of October, we had in the CHRONICLE, Paris news of the fourth, giving an account of the election of the Pope, and giving us also the official report of ADMIRAL DUPERRE, and of the attack and other important proceedings at Cadiz. All this was very faithfully copied into the OLD TIMES of the next day. The same may be said of the intelligence of the surrender of Lima. — On the eighth of October, the CHRONICLE gave us the Duc d'Angouleme's telegraphic despatch of the twenty-

ninth of September. The OLD TIMES, by getting an early printed *Chronicle*, got this important despatch into a small part of its papers of the eighth, and in the whole of its papers of the next day.—But, the next day is not always time enough to give to this “leading journal,” as it used to call itself; for, on the eleventh of October, the CHRONICLE (published early in the morning,) gave us Paris news of the tenth; that is to say, in less than twenty-four hours after it issued from the press in Paris. This news was of the most important character: it informed us of the voting of the Cortes, of the dissolution of that body, of the attack on Cadiz, of the arrival of the ambassadors at Port St. Mary, and of the fall in the French funds. This was on Saturday last. It could not have been in the OLD TIMES until Monday; and so, it was not in at all, the news of the surrender of Cadiz having arrived on the Sunday. But the Saturday's news was of vast importance, seeing that it so plainly

told us that the surrender *must* speedily take place.—Nor, does the case appear to be different as to *domestic intelligence*. God knows I think little of *Whig Dinners*; but, many persons do; and they serve even me to laugh at, and to remark on seriously sometimes. That of *Glasgow* occupied *nine columns* in the *CHRONICLE*, and the report *must* have been brought *express* the *four hundred and five miles*. In the *OLD TIMES*, the *next day*, the *OLD TIMES* made out and published, from the *Chronicle*, a report of about a *quarter of a column*. And, as to the *Whig Dinner at Chester*, the report relative to which *must* also have been brought up to the *Chronicle express*, and which occupied several columns, not a word of it ever appeared in *Old Mother Brodie* from first to last.—*Intelligence*, and especially *early intelligence*, is what we want in a

morning newspaper. Earliness is a *relative* quality: he who gets up at noon is an *early riser* compared with him who lays abed till sunset; and the *OLD TIMES* may still be an *early paper*; for there may be papers *two* days behind the *CHRONICLE*.—The natural consequence of what I have been observing upon, is, the *rapid decline* of *Walter's paper*, and the equally *rapid rise* of its rival; and, I shall be much deceived, if, *at the meeting of Parliament*, the *OLD TIMES* do not *fall down*, as if in a fit.

AMERICAN TREES.

THESE stand a poor chance of notice when subjects, like those treated of in this Register, present themselves. I shall, however, publish the notification *next week*.

MARKETS.

Average Prices of CORN throughout ENGLAND, for the week ending 4th October.

Per Quarter.		
	s.	d.
Wheat	46	4
Rye	27	4
Barley	26	0
Oats	20	11
Beans	32	10
Peas	30	10

Corn Exchange, Mark Lane.

Quantities and Prices of British Corn, &c. sold and delivered in this Market, during the week ended Saturday, 4th October.

Qrs.	£.	s.	d.	s.	d.
Wheat.. 7,311 for 18,038	19	4	Average, 49	4	
Barley.. 3,035....	4,078	1	6.....	26	10
Oats.. 12,193 ..	13,715	13	11.....	22	5
Rye..... 33 ..	54	10	6.....	33	0
Beans.. 1,334....	2,276	11	9.....	34	1
Peas.... 1,536....	2,402	15	2.....	31	3

Quarters of English Grain, &c. arrived Coastwise, from Oct. 6 to Oct. 11, inclusive.

Wheat.. 5,338	Pease.... 2,150
Barley.... 3,207	Tares..... 178
Malt..... 978	Linseed.... —
Oats.... 4,661	Rape 444
Rye..... 16	Brank..... —
Beans... 1,449	Mustard... 231

Various Seeds 285; and Hemp 35 qrs.—Flour 6,096 sacks.

From Ireland.—Oats 4,355 qrs.

Foreign. — Linseed 65; and Hemp 1,150 qrs.—Flour 101 barrels.

Friday, Oct. 10.—The supply of Grain is this week only moderate. Prime dry samples of Wheat meet buyers on rather better terms than Monday, but other qualities have no improvement. Barley of good quality remains as last quoted, but damp parcels are cheaper. Beans and Peas are unaltered. Good sweet Oats sell freely at last quotations, but other kinds go off slowly.

Monday, Oct. 13.—The arrivals of all descriptions of Grain last week were only moderate, and this morning the quantities fresh up are by no means considerable. Prime dry samples of Wheat, both Old and New, obtain 2s. per quarter more than this day se'nnight, but other qualities do not partake of this improvement.

Barley for malting obtains 1s. to 2s. advance on the terms of this day se'nnight, but other qualities are not any dearer. Beans, both Old and New, are advanced 1s. to 2s. per qr., and Grey Peas have obtained 1s. to 2s. per qr. more than this day week. There has been a lively trade for good Oats this morning, and last week's prices are fully maintained for this article, but many parcels of ordinary Old Oats remain on hand nearly unsaleable. Flour is unaltered.

COUNTRY CORN MARKETS.

By the QUARTER, excepting where otherwise named; from Wednesday to Saturday last, inclusive.

The Scotch Markets are the Returns of the Week before.

WHEAT.	s.	d.	s.	d.
Uxbridge, per load	9l.	0s.	16l.	10s.
Aylesbury... ditto	10l.	0s.	13l.	0s.
Newbury	42	0	—	62 0
Reading	38	0	—	56 0
Henley	40	0	—	52 0
Banbury	42	0	—	56 0
Devizes	42	0	—	64 0
Warminster	42	0	—	64 0
Sherborne	0	0	—	0 0
Dorchester, per load ...	11l.	0s.	16l.	0s.
Exeter, per bushel	6	6	—	7 6
Lewes	44	0	—	58 0
Guildford, per load	10l.	0s.	17l.	0s.
Winchester, ditto	0l.	0s.	0l.	0s.
Basingstoke	48	0	—	62 0
Chelmsford, per load ..	9l.	0s.	16l.	0s.
Yarmouth	42	0	—	48 0
Birmingham	0	0	—	0 0
Lynn	36	0	—	49 0
Horncastle	38	0	—	46 0
Stamford	35	0	—	52 0
Northampton	40	0	—	52 0
Truro, 24 galls. to a bush.	17	0	—	0 0
Swansea, per bushel. ...	7	0	—	0 0
Nottingham	0	0	—	0 0
Derby, 34 quarts to bush.	46	0	—	55 0
Newcastle	32	0	—	56 0
Dalkeith, per boll *	20	0	—	32 0
Haddington, ditto*	25	0	—	33 0

* The Scotch boll is 3 per cent more than 4 bushels.

Liverpool, Oct. 7.—Since Tuesday last the demand for Wheats has been gradually improving, and at Saturday's market an advance of 2d. to 3d. per bushel was obtained on sales made to a tolerable fair extent, so that the average prices may be now considered at 7s. 3d. to 8s. 9d. per 70 lbs. at this day's (Tuesday) market. In other articles of the trade there has been so little done as to leave prices nominally the same as last advised.

Imported into Liverpool from the 30th September to the 6th October, 1823, inclusive:—Wheat

1306; Oats 556; Barley 161; Malt 1658; and Beans 200 qrs. Oatmeal 247 packs per 240 lbs. Flour 673 sacks, and 420 barrels.

Norwich, Oct. 11.—There was a greater show of business here to-day than for some time past; good dry samples, particularly of Old Wheat, were in demand at 52s. to 54s. per qr.; New, 44s. to 46s. Barley is also higher, say 26s. to 27s.; Oats, 22s. to 25s.; Grey Peas, 26s. per quarter. Tares are much in request, at from 8s. to 10s. per bushel.

Bristol, Oct. 11.—The Corn business at this place is dull and the sales limited, at about the following prices.—Best Wheat from 7s. to 7s. 6d.; inferior ditto, 4s. 6d. to 6s. 3d.; Barley, 2s. 6d. to 3s. 4d.; Beans, 3s. to 5s.; Oats, 2s. to 3s.; and Malt 4s. 3d. to 6s. 6d. per bushel. Flour, Seconds, 26s. to 48s. per bag.

Birmingham, Oct. 9.—During the last fortnight Old Grain, generally, has continued to increase in value, and also fine dry New, in consequence of a short supply of these descriptions. Picked samples of Old Wheat are now worth 7s. per 60 lbs.; and those of New 6s. 6d.; inferior and damp samples are scarcely saleable. Barley of both malting and grinding qualities are in good demand at 25s. to 30s. per quarter; Oats, 22s. to 28s.; and Beans, 13s. 6d. to 14s. 6d. per ten scores. Peas are beginning to be inquired for at about 40s. to 44s. per quarter; Winter Tares are selling at 54s. to 60s.; and Malt 52s. to 56s. Old Fine Flour, at 45s. per sack; Old Seconds, 40s.; New fine, 40s.; and New Seconds, 37s., and a tolerably free sale.

Ipswich, Oct. 11.—Our market to-day was well supplied with Barley, but not much Wheat, and no Beans. Prices as follow:—Old Wheat, 60s. to 60s.; New ditto,

40s. to 50s.; Barley, 22s. to 27s.; Peas, 26s.; and Oats, 20s. to 24s. per quarter.

Wisbech, Oct. 11.—We had but little doing in the Wheat trade, prices much the same as last week. Mustard-seed a trifle higher for best quality; Rape-seed without alteration; and Oats rather brisker demand, but not higher.

Boston, Oct. 8.—We have had a plentiful supply of Wheat at this day's market, particularly the New, and sold as follows:—Wheat, 42s. to 49s.; Oats, 18s. to 22s.; Beans, 33s. to 36s.; and Barley 22s. to 28s. per quarter.

Wakefield, Oct. 10.—The arrivals of Wheat this week are rather large, but of other descriptions of Grain the supply is small. Old Wheat and fine New were in request, and fully supported last week's prices; but inferior sorts of New were difficult of sale, and rather lower. No alteration to note in Barley or Oats. Shelling being scarce, was taken off at an advance of 6d. to 1s. per load. Malt very dull sale, and lower. Rapeseed was much in request, at the prices of last week.

Malton, Oct. 11.—Our market continues without any variation in the prices of Grain since last week.—Wheat, Old, 54s. to 56s.; New ditto, 48s. to 50s. per quarter, five stone per bushel. Barley, 26s. to 28s. per quarter. Oats, 10d. to 10½d. per stone.

SMITHFIELD, Monday, Oct. 13.

Per Stone of 8 pounds (alive).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef	2	10	to	3 6
Mutton.....	3	2	—	3 10
Veal.....	3	8	—	4 10
Pork.....	4	6	—	5 0
Lamb	0	0	—	0 0

Beasts ... 3,126 | Sheep ... 21,580
Calves 190 | Pigs 260

NEWGATE (same day).

Per Stone of 8 pounds (dead).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef	2	4	to	3 0
Mutton.....	2	2	—	3 2
Veal.....	3	8	—	4 4
Pork.....	3	4	—	5 4
Lamb	0	0	—	0 0

LEADENHALL (same day).

Per Stone of 8 pounds (dead).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef.....	1	10	to	3 0
Mutton.....	2	8	—	3 2
Veal.....	3	0	—	4 6
Pork.....	2	8	—	4 8
Lamb.....	0	0	—	0 0

City, 15 October 1823.

BACON.

The market has been very heavy since our last, and prices are a little lower. But the manufacturers have discovered (*as usual*) that the potatoe crops are short; and this, in the absence of a better, will, by-and-by, be a ground for a new speculation.—On board, 32s.—Land-ed, New, 41s. to 43s.; Old, 36s.

BUTTER.

About this time last year, an individual purchased more than 100,000*l.* worth of Butter, on speculation; and a great many others purchased smaller quantities, induced by his example. It was found, however, that the stock was

too heavy and prices too high, to admit of any advance: and the speculation failed. And yet, with prices quite as high, and the stock greatly surpassing that of last year, there have now been persons desperate enough to enter into extensive engagements. If the consequences fell upon themselves alone, they might be left to bear them: but it is not so: a numerous class of industrious men are injured by their proceedings. In other branches of trade the merchants employ the brokers; but in this trade *the brokers employ the merchants*: nay, in some instances, they *set them going*, and keep them going, as long as they find them useful, and then suffer them to fall back into their original insignificance. These brokers are *clever fellows*, and are every way qualified for making use of such instruments. It is not an uncommon thing to hear them boast of their own gains, and at the same time laugh at the losses of the *merchants*. Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that prices rise one day and fall the next without any apparent cause: and we shall not be surprised, even now, though every thing seems against it, if an advance take place before the end of the present month. —At the present prices every thing loses money to the importers; and upon all that is not *fresh* (and there is a great deal that is not), there is a loss of full 7 per cent.—On

board, Carlow, 78s. to 80s.—Waterford, 74s. to 76s.—Dublin, 75s.—Cork, or Limerick, 72s. to 73s.—Landed: Carlow, 80s. to 82s.—Belfast, 78s. to 80s.—Dublin, 77s. to 78s.—Waterford, 75s. to 77s.—Cork, or Limerick, 74s. to 75s.—Dutch, 88s. to 92s.—Other foreign, about equal in quality to Waterford or Limerick, 66s. to 70s.; and of this there is a great abundance.

CHEESE.

There is still a brisk demand for every thing good.—Old Cheshire (fine), 78s. to 82s.; good, 70s. to 76s.; new, 58s. to 64s.—New Derby, 56s. to 64s.—Double Gloucester, 58s. to 64s.; Single, 48s. to 60s.

POTATOES.

SPITALFIELDS.—per Ton.

Ware	£ 2	0	to	£3	15
Middlings.....	1	10	—	1	15
Chats.....	1	10	—	0	0
Common Red..	0	0	—	0	0
Onions..	0s.	0d.	—	0s.	0d. per bush.

BOROUGH.—per Ton.

Ware.....	£.2	10	to	£3	10
Middlings.....	1	10	—	2	0
Chats.....	1	10	—	0	0
Common Red..	0	0	—	0	0
Onions..	0s.	0d.	—	0s.	0d. per bush.

HAY and STRAW, per Load.*Smithfield.*—Hay....84s. to 97s.

Straw...40s. to 46s.

Clover...90s. to 105s.

St. James's.—Hay....75s. to 110s.

Straw...42s. to 54s.

Clover 100s. to 120s.

Whitechapel.—Hay....80s. to 110s.

Straw...40s. to 46s.

Clover...90s. to 126s.

HOPS.

Maidstone, Oct. 9.—The Hop picking and packing is now quite over, and the few planters that

were fortunate in growing some are all offering their samples at market, but we scarce hear of a sale being made. The prices asked are from 10*l.* to 14*l.* per cwt., which the buyers at present not being inclined to give, nothing is done. Duty called 20,000*l.*

Worcester, Oct. 4.—Only one pocket of Worcester Hops of this year's growth has yet been brought to this market, for which 12*l.* 12s. to 14*l.* 14s. have been offered, but it has not yet been sold. Prices are rather flatter, and the sale is dull. 1822, 8*l.* to 10*l.* 10s. 1821, 4*l.* 6s. to 5*l.*